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Role Perceptions, Party Cohesion and Political Attitudes 
of East and West German Parliamentarians 
Findings from the Jena Parliamentary Survey (2003–4)*
MICHAEL EDINGER and LARS VOGEL**
Jena University
Abstract: This article deals with similarities and differences in the orientations of
East and West German MPs more than a decade after the unification of the coun-
try. Based on data from the Jena Parliamentary Survey, thus far the largest sur-
vey among German parliamentarians, carried out in 2003–4, the paper discusses
three hypotheses. While differences between deputies from the East and the
West are found to be significant for some dimensions, they are, in general, sub-
ordinate to if not derived from the inter-factional differences induced by party
competition. In spite of this evident impact of partisanship, German parliamen-
tary parties exhibit unexpectedly low levels of party discipline / party unity in
their attitudes towards the party and policy preferences. This phenomenon is
slightly more pronounced in East Germany than in the West. Viewed against the
background of parties as monopolists in the recruitment process and the reward
schemes for MPs, this represents the most surprising finding from the survey.
Sociologický časopis/Czech Sociological Review, 2005, Vol. 41, No. 3: 375–399
Introduction: German unity as an experiment for parliamentary integration
The peaceful autumn revolution of 1989 not only paved the way for German unifi-
cation it also led to the rebirth of parliamentary democracy in Eastern Germany af-
ter decades of dictatorship. The new parliamentarians from the East German states,
though not necessarily complete political novices, were ‘newcomers’ to the world of
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representative democracy. As such they had hardly any experience with parliamen-
tary politics. For this reason, not to mention their socialisation in political systems
as divergent as those of the GDR and the FRG, the differences between East and
West German MPs in the initial post-unification period were pronounced. 
Consequently, East German parliamentary life in its early stages was to some
extent a micro-level experiment, exhibiting some parallels with the ‘great social ex-
periment’ of German unification. Learning by doing, the new MPs, as the actors in
parliamentary democracy, had to define their roles as the elected representatives of
the people and accustom themselves to the rules of the parliamentary ‘game’.
Against this background it comes as no surprise that parliamentary life has under-
gone some significant changes since 1990. The changes that deputies have under-
gone can be characterised as a shift from amateurism to a more ‘professional’ con-
duct, the blueprints for which were provided by West German MPs. They are best
reflected in the career paths and career strategies of parliamentarians. Yet it remains
uncertain to what extent the processes of adaptation and convergence have been ac-
companied by changes in role perceptions and political orientations. Almost fifteen
years after the re-establishment of parliamentary democracy and after three legisla-
tive terms, the time seems right to take stock.
It is evident that the processes mentioned above cannot be addressed just by
studying MPs’ biographies or by analysing their voting behaviour. Proper answers
require information that only the parliamentarians themselves can provide. Such in-
formation is available on approximately 900 Germans MPs, both from the Bundes-
tag and from ten (out of sixteen) state legislatures, from the Jena Parliamentary Sur-
vey in 2003–4, the largest so far in Germany since the Second World War. The sur-
vey was conducted between September 2003 and February 2004 through telephone
interviews (CATI); in this procedure a methodological innovation was introduced
into representative elite research.1 In comparison to previous research the overall
turnout was satisfactory, with well over one-half of all MPs (57.4%) taking part in the
survey. But state legislators are strongly over-represented (with fewer national MPs
responding), and MPs from the communist successor party, PDS, are also clearly
over-represented.2
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1 Within the framework of the Sonderforschungsbereich 580 it was possible to carry out 921
full interviews with an average duration of about 40 minutes each. Another 33 interview were
conducted with German members of the European Parliament and yet another 550 inter-
views with former national and state legislators. For the purpose of this article these inter-
views are excluded from the analysis. For in-depth information on the concept and on the
methodological aspects of the survey compare Jahr and Edinger [2005 forthcoming].
2 The over-representation of the Socialist MPs from PDS is less pronounced when East and
West German MPs are analysed separately, as the PDS has no parliamentary representation
in the Western legislatures and the response rates in East Germany were high across PPGs.
The exact response rates by parliamentary level and by government/opposition are present-
ed in Appendix 1; the rates for the parliamentary party groups and East and West German
legislators are in Appendix 2. Given the focus of the analysis the decision was made against
using party weights because throughout the analysis the comparison is always West, East
In spite of the fact that MPs are of obvious interest to at least two branches of
political sociology, i.e. parliamentary research and elite studies, there is little litera-
ture available that this article could draw on.3 Whilst German unification sparked
off research on representative elites from East Germany, its focus was mainly on
elite circulation and on the recruitment of Eastern state legislators.4 In the early and
mid-1990s systematic research into attitudes, and particularly role perceptions, was
carried out almost exclusively by Werner Patzelt [Patzelt 1994].5 Using survey data
he was able to show that, as early as the first legislative term, the role perceptions
of East German MPs had become similar to those of their Western colleagues
[Patzelt 2001]. For the past ten years though no survey-based research has been un-
dertaken that included more than one parliament.
The analysis in this article relies almost exclusively on data from the survey’s
telephone interviews. Taking some concepts from the literature on representation
and party cohesion as inspiration for the analytical framework, the emphasis here
is on analysing new data in order to identify zones of similarity and zones of dif-
ference between East and West German MPs. However, the analysis is not limited
to a single dimension of comparison. Instead, it also comprises the reasons for the
prevalence of differences more than a dozen years after German unification. The
analysis is based on three hypotheses:
(i) With regard to political attitudes the integration of East and West German legislators lags
behind the level of integration in terms of role perceptions (‘the cultural lag’). Role percep-
tions of parliamentarians are shaped by the existing structure of opportunities. Since
many components of the legal and political framework defining such opportunities
are roughly the same in East and West Germany, MPs’ role perceptions should have
become more similar. This is not the case with regard to political orientations and to
policy preferences in particular. These attitudes can be traced to political socialisa-
tion, and they are also influenced by the values and policy preferences of the elec-
torate. With regard to both, obvious differences between East and West exist.
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without PDS and PDS, and because generally PPGs are controlled for. When distinguishing,
for example, the PDS from the other parliamentary parties, it was possible to check whether
its over-representation produced a major bias for the overall distribution or not. 
3 This observation obviously does not refer to the parliaments of Central and Eastern Europe
(CEE) and their members. Since this article deals only with German MPs, East and West Ger-
man alike, almost no reference to the literature on CEE parliaments is made.
4 The key finding of exceptional elite circulation [cf. Derlien 1997] was recently confirmed for
the representative elite; compare Edinger [2004]. For the recruitment of East German state
legislators see Lock [1998].
5 Some aspects are also covered in the surveys carried out by Bernhard Wessels among
members of the Bundestag in 1996 and in 2003 [Katz and Wessels 1999; Wessels 2005]. The
focus of both surveys though was considerably different from the Sonderforschungsbereich
survey, and the analyses of the findings have not yet included a systematic comparison of
East and West German MPs.
(ii) Although differences between MPs from East and West are of some significance, party
affiliation is a more distinguishing factor. As is common in a party democracy like Ger-
many, political and parliamentary discourse is structured along party lines. There-
fore, big differences between members of different caucuses are almost trivial. How-
ever, the argument here is that such differences also extend (a) to those orientations
that are not related to political conflicts, and (b) to politics, that is, to matters of de-
mocratic decision-making.
(iii) In accordance with the pre-unification status quo the parties in parliament remain co-
hesive. Parliamentary party discipline, as documented by voting along party lines in
committees and the plenary alike, rests on a broad set of shared beliefs and convic-
tions held by MPs from the same party group. Strong party cohesion cannot be tak-
en for granted, and even less so given that inter-party divisions (the topic of the sec-
ond hypothesis) may also co-exist with moderate degrees of inner-party unity.
These hypotheses will not be discussed separately here or treated in sections
because they are directly related to one another. Serving as ‘underlying’ hypotheses,
they will be referred to throughout the text and they will be tested in any of the three
following chapters where appropriate. Section two in the article is devoted to the
role perceptions of German parliamentarians, addressing the focus of representa-
tion and parliamentary career ambitions among MPs. In the third section questions
relating to parliament as an institution will be dealt with. The focus here is on the
attitudes of MPs towards their own parliamentary party group (PPG), that is, on
party discipline and party cohesion. Another aspect of PPG unity is analysed in the
fourth section through an investigation into MPs’ political convictions, politics ori-
entations, and (some) policy preferences. Referring back to the hypotheses, the con-
clusion will present a discussion of the empirical findings and try to identify how
different East and West German MPs (still) are. 
Role perceptions: representation and career orientations
In The Legislative System by Wahlke et al. [1962: 8] the authors interpret the role of
an MP as referring to “a coherent set of ‘norms’ of behaviour which are thought by
those involved in the interactions being viewed to apply to all persons who occupy
the position of legislator”. The role concept is generally used to bridge the gap be-
tween the structural and the action-oriented approach to social reality. On the one
hand, roles articulate the demands of the system through certain standards of be-
haviour. On the other hand, the behaviour is not fully determined by the role. Some
scope remains for interpreting role expectations, which enables the deputy to re-
spond to structural and situational conditions. In this analysis the role perceptions
of MPs are therefore interpreted as an MP’s generalised understanding of his or her
own behaviour, shaped by both normative expectations and structural conditions. 
One of the most important contexts is the generalised relationship between
deputies and their constituents. In modern democracies this relationship ought to
Sociologický časopis/Czech Sociological Review, 2005, Vol. 41, No. 3
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constitute some kind of representation. As Hanna F. Pitkin pointed out, represen-
tation “means the making present in some sense of something which is nevertheless
not present literally or in fact” [Pitkin 1967: 8–9]. Most of the literature on represen-
tation focuses on how something is made present, therefore often referring to
Burke’s distinction between trustee and delegate. Since Patzelt [1993: 181–219] has
shown that this distinction is almost irrelevant for the daily work of German
deputies, we must shift our perspective towards the object that is made present, i.e.
the focus of representation.
In the survey a forced choice question was asked about whether MPs see
themselves primarily as a representative of the whole country, of the constituency,
of the MP’s particular set of voters or of the party (see Table 1). The results may in-
dicate some kind of social desirability, as the absolute majority of MPs perceive
themselves as representatives of the whole country, while only a small minority
claim to primarily represent their party or their own voters.6 Representing the con-
stituency is considered the priority by around one-fourth of the MPs. This amount
is significantly related (Cramer’s V: 0.23, p<0.01) to the conditions of candidature,
whereby MPs who won a district directly are more likely to see themselves as rep-
resentatives of that constituency. Given that the German electoral system, though
largely proportional, also includes a majoritarian element, one-half of the seats in
the national and a comparable proportion in most of the state parliaments have to
be won in Single Member Districts (SMD)7. Deputies from small parties like Greens
Michael Edinger and Lars Vogel: Role Perceptions, Party Cohesion and Political Attitudes
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6 This result stands in sharp contrast to the preferences Czech MPs express on the focus of
representation. In response to an almost identical question as the one used in this survey,
only around one-fourth of Czech deputies in 2003 saw themselves mainly as representatives
of all citizens. The authors thank Zdenka Mansfeldová for providing these figures. 
7 The ‘personalised proportional’ election system in Germany allows two different modes of
candidature. Each voter has two votes. The second vote decides the proportional amount of
seats in parliament a party could gain. The first vote decides the candidates, which are elect-
ed by a relative majority in each constituency. The mandates a party has gained directly are
subtracted from all possible mandates for the party. Therefore, half of the seats are held by
directly elected MPs, while the other half are held by candidates who ran on party lists. Most
Table 1. German MPs’ focus of representation by PPG (%)
Note: When the sum of percentages does not equal 100 this is due to truncation.
          
East 
(n=430) 
West 
(n=421) 
Christian 
Democrats      
(CDU) (n=333) 
Social 
Democrats      
(SPD) 
(n=299) 
Liberals    
(FDP) 
(n=49) 
Greens 
(B90) 
(n=43) 
Socialists 
(PDS) 
(n=123) 
Party   9 11 5 10 10 26 16 
Voters 15 12 10 11 8 21 27 
Constituency 21 29 33 28 10 5 9 
Whole country  56 49 53 50 71 49 48 
and Liberals but also the Socialists, that is, the post-communist PDS,8 are mostly
elected on party lists and, therefore, they are more likely to see themselves as rep-
resentatives of the party or of their voters than of any constituency. 
Although party size matters, the East-West difference relating to the focus of
representation does not stem from the PDS alone. The slightly stronger emphasis on
representing the country in the East is caused by the Eastern MPs from the Social
Democrats (SPD) and the Christian Democrats (CDU). Directly elected Western
MPs at both levels are split between their role as representatives of the whole coun-
try or of their district, even when the mode of election is controlled for. Directly
elected Eastern members of the national parliament (MNPs) clearly favour their con-
stituency. The members of the state parliaments (MSPs), however, do not focus as
much on district, but rather underscore the aspects of representing the whole coun-
try and – to a lesser extent – their own voters.9
While only subtle distinctions appear between East and West with regard to
the focus of representation, the differences result from structural conditions rather
than opposing concepts of representation. The stronger orientation towards the dis-
trict among Eastern MNPs could be understood as an effect of their view of the
mandate as the representation of special Eastern interests, which – in their view –
still require particular attention.
Surveys conducted on MPs in West Germany before unification showed in
general a stronger orientation towards the district among state legislators. This was
explained by the smaller size of their constituencies, which is likely associated with
having a closer relationship and greater integration [Patzelt 1993: 137]. This rela-
tionship does not, however, appear in the data from the project research. Most MPs
at both levels see themselves as representatives of the whole country. But given that
the question on the focus of representation was designed as a forced choice ques-
tion, compelling respondents to make a decision between alternatives, the outcome
could be interpreted as an attitude of putting ‘shared interests first’. It implies that,
in cases of conflict, the MP is expected to evaluate particular constituency interests
as secondary. When related to incumbency, the proportion of MPs that represent
the whole country increases and the proportion of constituency-oriented MPs di-
minishes, while support for the two other foci of representation remains stable. This
relationship is not observed in the Eastern state parliaments. 
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MPs attempt to be nominated in an SMD and on a party list to increase their chances of get-
ting elected. This system of election is used for the Bundestag and for most of the state par-
liaments in the survey, except for Baden-Württemberg and Saarland. 
8 It should be noted that the PDS has no parliamentary representation in West German leg-
islatures and only two MPs in the Bundestag. Conversely, the Greens are not represented in
East German state legislatures, and the FDP won mandates only in one out of five state leg-
islatures (Saxony). Therefore, only CDU and SPD are represented in all eleven parliaments in-
cluded in the survey.
9 Whenever no distinction between MNPs and MSPs is made, and unless otherwise indicat-
ed, the findings reported refer to all MPs.
It is likely that the MPs who see themselves mostly as representatives of their
district devote more time to constituency work, and this is also a matter of role per-
ception as a deputy. Therefore, on the one hand there are MPs who are found to em-
phasise work within the parliament, and on the other hand there are MPs who are
preoccupied with activities in the district, such as networking, offering services and
explaining policies on the ground; in short, connecting parliament to the electorate.
But such a distinction is more a question of graded differences than one of a clear-
cut decision. When the MPs are classified into three categories – ‘parliament work-
ers’, ‘constituency workers’ and those claiming an equal distribution between par-
liament and district work – it is evident that almost half of the deputies devote more
time to work in parliament. As such, German MPs see themselves mainly as ‘par-
liament workers’, but working at the ground level also appears to be important.
Deputies from the Eastern Länder still devote more time to parliamentary work as
opposed to district work when compared to their Western counterparts, which con-
firms earlier findings from the mid-1990s [Patzelt 2001: 72]. 
There is no big difference in the distribution of working hours between MPs
elected in SMDs and those elected on party lists. It seems that focusing one’s work
on the constituency is unrelated to the mode of election, but it is closely related to
the MP’s perception of representing primarily the constituency. However, the direc-
tion of the relationship is somewhat ambiguous. It could be argued that the more an
MP works in the constituency the higher the amount of claming district representa-
tion, or the reverse could be true. The first interpretation is supported by the fact that
Cramer’s V is higher in the East. Therefore, MPs in the West may be linked to their
constituency by slightly better developed networks which require the exertion of less
personal effort by the MP. Their Eastern counterparts still have to invest more time
into these networks,10 and when they do they are more likely to have a district orien-
tation. Thus, the relationship to the constituency is also built up between elections.
While the focus of representation is closely related to the distribution of work-
ing time, it is only loosely linked to role-perception views on politics as an occupa-
tion. The overwhelming majority of the MPs in the East and the West perceive pol-
itics as a genuine occupation. Nevertheless, only a minority of MPs had planned for
a long-term political career when they first entered parliament, and the proportion
is even lower in the East. When PPGs are controlled for it becomes evident that the
PDS makes the difference. However, the party matters equally in the East and the
West in terms of career orientation. The research results showed that deputies from
the two major parties tend to focus more on their political career, whereas MPs from
the Greens and the Socialists displayed the lowest ambitions.
The number of MNPs that plan a political career from the beginning increas-
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10 This is supported by the fact that Eastern MPs who once belonged to a of civil society or-
ganisation often serve as members of their boards or even as their presidents, while such a
relationship is nowhere near as strong in the West. This is probably related to the rebuilding
of civil society in the East, where representative elites are likely to also be found in prominent
positions in civil society organisations.
es in relation to how low their incumbency is (Cramer’s V: 0.37, p<0.01), but this re-
lationship is not found for MSPs. Holding a mandate in the Bundestag has since
1990 increasingly come to be viewed as a starting point for a political career, both in
East and West Germany. Generally, once in parliament, most MPs in the East and
the West would like to stand for re-election. However, the chances of getting re-
elected depend both on how an MP behaves within the caucus and the MP’s inter-
action with the electorate, and this points to the relationship between the focus of
representation and party discipline. The demand that MPs toe the party line when
it comes to votes in the plenary or in the committees can clash with the preferred
focus of representation, as the interests of the PPG may not always be perceived as
matching, for example, the interests of the constituency. To examine this we built an
index of demand for PPG discipline.11
MPs that see themselves as representatives of their party are found to have the
highest demand for PPG discipline, probably because party discipline is considered
to be in the interest of the party, while MPs that are representatives of their voters
are found to be significantly below average in this respect (see Table 2). Further-
more, the majority of district- and country-oriented deputies support PPG disci-
pline. Therefore, one could argue that many MPs perceive PPG discipline as an es-
sential mechanism for achieving political aims also for those they feel they ought to
be representing foremost. Only in the East is representing voters seen to being tense
relationship to party discipline. Among the PPGs only the deputies of PDS reject
PPG discipline in the majority – no matter whom they represent.
This review of several aspects of role perceptions has revealed one clear ten-
dency: most of the differences between Eastern and Western MPs are due to the dis-
tinctions of the party system or to slight differences in the general structures of op-
portunity than to fundamentally divided role perceptions. With regard to the focus
Sociologický časopis/Czech Sociological Review, 2005, Vol. 41, No. 3
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11 This additive index was built out of two items. The first item measures the demand for co-
herent voting behaviour when important decisions are concerned, the second one, once re-
coded, measures the opposition to more autonomous voting for the individual PPG member.
Respondents can reach between two and eight points on the party discipline index. MPs with
six or more points are considered as strong supporters of party discipline, while all others
show only weak support. The cutting point is identical with that after z-transformation when
respondents above average are counted as favouring strong party discipline.
Table 2. Demand for party discipline by focus of representation (%)
 
All 
MPs 
(n=794) 
East German MPs 
(n=384) 
West 
German 
MPs 
(n=410) 
East German MPs 
without PDS 
(n=281) 
MPs from PDS 
(n=103) 
Party 66 61 70 81 40 
Voters 37 23 53 32 14 
Constituency 58 55 60 61 11 
Whole country 60 52 69 64 14 
 
 
of representation, differences are somehow secondary in comparison with the over-
whelming preference for representing the whole country – PPG affiliation and elec-
tion as a district or a list MP are more decisive than East-West differences. A simi-
lar picture appears in terms of the distribution of work between parliament and con-
stituency. Some tendencies that occur in the West are rather pronounced in the East,
for example, tendencies found in the relationship between the focus of representa-
tion and party discipline, and it is this aspect that will be dealt with in the follow-
ing chapter.
Party unity at stake: attitudes towards parliamentary party groups 
and parliament as an institution 
While the relationship with the public is of crucial importance for deputies, much
of their everyday activity relates to parliamentary work. The parliament as an insti-
tution, with its rules and procedures, consequently shapes the perceptions and the
behaviour of its members. In the survey, we tried to capture MPs’ views on parlia-
mentary procedures and parliamentary reform through a set of questions related to
the importance of parliament, problems of serving as an MP and reform proposals.
A related topic, also covered in the questionnaire, is the relationship between the in-
dividual MP and the caucus. Do noticeable differences exist between MPs from East
and West Germany regarding the relationship to their own PPG? Is it possible to de-
tect varying degrees of party cohesion between caucuses?
There is a huge body of literature on party cohesion and party discipline and
the topic has regained academic interest during the past couple of years [see e.g.
Bowler, Farrell and Katz 1999; Hazan 2003]. Nevertheless, the distinction between
the two concepts more often than not seems insufficient. Another striking phe-
nomenon is how much emphasis has been put on MPs’ voting behaviour, and roll
call analysis in particular, while other important aspects that could be associated
with party cohesion (such as shared politics and policy attitudes) have been ne-
glected. As Hazan points out: “examining voting behaviour is not enough, because
we must look at (…) what takes place before voting decisions are made” [Hazan
2003a: 8]. In the light of such advice, this section presents an examination of the
various orientations MPs maintain towards their parliamentary group, and which
are interpreted as indicators of ‘party unity’. For the purpose of this article, party
unity comprises ‘party discipline’ (united voting plus directly related attitudes) and
‘party cohesion’ (shared attitudes).12 Given that the analysis at hand is based solely
on survey data, it also draws on reported voting behaviour13 and the index on party
Michael Edinger and Lars Vogel: Role Perceptions, Party Cohesion and Political Attitudes
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12 It should be noted that, as a consequence, party unity is used here as the genus proximum
for discipline and cohesion, and it is not used as a distinct analytical category as suggested
elsewhere [Linek and Rakušanová 2002: 48-49].
13 The item reads: ‘Did you ever vote against your own PPG in an important vote even though
voting with the PPG was expected’.
discipline (see above) to measure party discipline. Party cohesion can encompass
shared political orientations (comp. section 4), but here we are looking more specif-
ically at attitudes on parliament as an institution.
Parties in the German parliaments traditionally exhibit relatively unified be-
haviour. Faction splits and mergers happen rarely, inter-faction mobility is usually
low, and voting against one’s own PPG is considered a serious violation of internal
norms unless issues of high ethical importance (‘questions of conscience’) are at
stake.14 Still, some disunity did occur during the first term of the new state legisla-
tures (1990–94), when parliamentary democracy in East Germany was still in its for-
mative period. Since then, however, the situation has changed and the new parlia-
ments have become much like their counterparts Western.15
When considering the initial differences between East and West it is highly
relevant whether the evident changes in parliamentary party discipline are also re-
flected in MPs’ perceptions. Our findings confirm the actual voting behaviour in at
least one respect: a much higher proportion of East compared to West German MPs
report having at least once voted against their PPG in an important vote, even
though they were expected to adhere to the party line. Obviously, longstanding MPs
report deviating from their party group more frequently than newly elected MPs. It
nonetheless comes as a surprise that statistically significant differences also exist
between newcomers. Regardless of how long respondents held a parliamentary
seat, the percentage of East German MPs with a record of deviant voting was always
higher than among West Germans. Even more surprisingly, the gap between the two
groups is barely shrinks even when the PDS are excluded from the analysis.
Although the proportion of dissenters increases the more the notion of party
discipline is challenged (Cramer’s V: 0.29, p<0.01), it is striking how widespread the
phenomenon of (occasional) PPG disloyalty has become. Four out of ten strong sup-
porters of party discipline have dissented from their faction in an important vote at
least once during their parliamentary career. Even among the respondents who
showed maximal support for party discipline this figure amounts to 27%.16 While the
East-West divergence in reported voting discipline is not caused by differences be-
tween the East and the West German party system, the weaker support for party dis-
cipline among Eastern MPs is clearly related to the PDS. The low party discipline
among Socialist MPs may appear puzzling at first glance, especially when one takes
into account the history of the PDS as a hegemonic state party, but it somewhat cor-
responds to the heterogeneous composition of its caucuses. On the one hand the
PDS recruits its MPs from among the GDR sub-elites, on the other hand it deliber-
Sociologický časopis/Czech Sociological Review, 2005, Vol. 41, No. 3
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14 It should be noted that the situation was rather different during the first two terms of the
Bundestag when up to eight factions existed in the national parliament and when the party
system had not yet been stabilised. The relevant figures are found in Schindler [1999: 938-42,
1781-87]. For a general analysis of the structural incentives for party cohesion and party dis-
cipline in Germany see Patzelt [2003]. 
15 For empirical evidence see Davidson-Schmich [2003].
16 Maximum support for party discipline is given when respondents reach all eight points on
the party discipline scale. 
ately promotes candidates affiliated with certain groups in society and with specific
socio-demographic features, for example young candidates, women and also non-
party members. 
While reported PPG discipline is lowest among the Socialists, it is well above
average for parliamentarians from the Greens. Yet their deputies do not consider
strong party discipline to be particularly important, as unity in voting may be taken
for granted. The Greens consequently displayed the lowest proportion of inconsis-
tent responses, i.e. MPs who demand strong party discipline while having them-
selves dissented from the PPG in at least one important vote. The strongest demand
for party discipline was voiced by the Social Democrats, although their reported dis-
cipline is only slightly higher than the average. In spite of this, inconsistent re-
sponses are no more common among the SPD than among Christian Democrats and
Liberals. As illustrated in the last column of Table 3, one out of four respondents
from those three long-established parties (or rather their caucuses) demands what
he himself or she herself is not willing to fully comply with: party discipline. The
figures for PDS and Greens are much lower but for different reasons. Whereas
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17 It is worth noting that Czech MPs in 2000 showed much more support for party discipline,
though the Rice Index for the Czech Chamber of Deputies is considerably lower than for Ger-
man parliaments [Linek and Rakušanová 2002: 35 and 50-51]. The lesson to be learned from
these contrasting cases at two slightly different points in time seems to be that the less par-
ty discipline that exists, the stronger the demand for it, and the more party discipline is ad-
hered to, the less it is appreciated.
Table 3. Demanded and reported party discipline by PPG (%)
 Party discipline 
 Strong xx 
demand*17 
Reported Demanded 
but not reported 
(as % of PPG 
members with 
strong demand) 
Demanded but not  
reported 
(as % of all PPG 
members) 
CDU 
(n=330/355) 59 46 45 27 xxxx 
FDP  
(n=51/51) 51 41 46 24 xxxx 
SPD 
(n=305/326) 73 54 38 27 xxxx 
B90 
(n=42/44) 48 71 20 10 xxxx 
PDS 
(n=118/128) 21 35 46 9 xxxx 
Total 
(n=851/907) 57 49 41 23 xxxx 
Strong xx 
demand*17 
* See footnote 11 on the construction of the party discipline index and the cutting point.
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among the Green PPGs the demand for discipline is much lower than what is actu-
ally practiced (reported), among the PDS there are few candidates for inconsisten-
cy, because the voting discipline is relatively low. 
How relevant are PPGs to the differences between East and West when the fo-
cus of the analysis turns to MPs’ views on parliament as institution? East-West dif-
ferences exist to some degree – and so do variations between PPGs – but we find
the more visible dividing line between government and opposition MPs. While two
out of three MPs in an opposition party view the influence of parliament as one the
decline, this view is held by only 43% of deputies from the government benches. 
The gulf between majority and minority MPs corresponds with the logic of parlia-
mentary democracy based on the nearly complete fusion of the executive and the
legislative powers (Bagehot), or in other words on the notion of the ‘governing ma-
jority’. 
Still, out of the four reform proposals deputies were asked their opinion on,
only one is a source of serious controversy between the parliamentary majority and
the opposition: the quest for stronger reporting obligations for the government (see
Figure 1). As expected, members of the majority PPGs attach little importance to
this reform issue, while for MPs from the opposition it ranks first in importance.
Huge differences between government and opposition MPs also exist within every
single parliamentary party. For example, the Social Democrats in the opposition are
Figure 1. Attitudes towards two parliamentary reform proposals by East/West German
and majority/opposition MPs (%)
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much more in favour of such a reform than the Social Democratic members of the
governing PPGs.
While the right of parliament to gain earlier and more comprehensive infor-
mation on government activities marks the dividing line between MPs from the gov-
erning and the opposition parliamentary parties, East and West German MPs are
split over the importance of work resources. Whereas better resources, be it more
personnel or better parliamentary facilities, are of some importance to many West
German MPs, this is clearly not the case with MPs in the new federal states (see Fig-
ure 1). It seems that East German deputies do not attach much meaning to institu-
tional support. This contrasts with the frequent complaints over insufficient time
for reflecting on political problems and for private life. Judging from the experience
of one of the best-equipped parliaments in the world, the US Congress, it comes as
a surprise that particularly East German MPs do not expect benefits from improved
work facilities. They seem therefore to neglect a relevant part of the institutional
conditions that ‘frame’ their activities as elected representatives of the people. 
With regard to members of the Bundestag, the item battery on parliamentary
reform provides a rare opportunity for a comparison over time. Therefore, the survey
also used questions reproduced from an earlier survey of German national MPs car-
ried out at the end of the 1980s by Dietrich Herzog and his research team. The find-
ings are intriguing as they show both high levels of continuity and tremendous
changes over a time span of fifteen years. Almost the same proportion of national
MPs as a decade and a half ago consider more information rights for the Bundestag
and better public relations work as the most urgent reform issues. The opposite is
true for the two other reform proposals at stake. Whereas a considerable proportion
of the members of the 11th Bundestag voiced strong support for better parliamentary
resources and for more rights to individual deputies, these are no longer matters of
priority. The parliamentary infrastructure still concerns at least some members of the
Bundestag, though less so the state legislators. Nevertheless, the status of the indi-
vidual MP, which spurred much debate at the time and even led to rulings from the
constitutional court, has completely vanished from the reform agenda. 
The shift of the focus of parliamentary reform, as illustrated by the figures in
Table 4, takes us back to the relationship between MPs and their factions. While
every second deputy feels that individual MPs are hardly ever capable of changing
the status quo, in the new data this no longer results in a quest for institutional
change (in favour of the MP as an individual), which may have been the case in the
past. Instead, MPs in 2003–4 turned to their parliamentary parties but at the same
time they expressed less support for party discipline. They even expressed the free-
dom to dissent on rare occasions from their PPG in an important vote. 
The analysis in this section places a question mark behind the seemingly clear-
cut issue of party discipline in German parliaments,18 albeit only at the level of atti-
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18 Recent anecdotic evidence justifies the question mark. In March 2005 Heide Simonis failed
to obtain re-election as Prime Minister of Schleswig-Holstein in four subsequent parliamen-
tudes. More importantly, it reveals the varying degrees of relevance that the region-
al background of MPs has on different dimensions of party unity. Party discipline,
both as reported and as demanded by parliamentarians, is still much stronger
among West German deputies. The East-West gulf is not bridged even when con-
trolling for the PDS. In sharp contrast to the findings on party discipline, the re-
gional background is of limited importance for party cohesion. Overall, PPG affili-
ation is highly relevant for both discipline and cohesion, though in some instances
the majority-opposition divide is more decisive. The next section will examine
whether similar patterns can be found in yet another dimension of party unity:
shared political orientations.
Political attitudes: convictions, politics and policies 
Three types of political orientations will be discussed in this section, so it is first
necessary to sketch how basic convictions, attitudes on politics, and policy prefer-
ences are inter-related. Political convictions can be understood as the very founda-
tions of political attitudes. As such they should allow for a proper distinction be-
tween parties, while at the same time they are capable of serving as a formula for
integration within parties. Generally speaking, this is less the case with political
procedures. Questions of decision-making (politics) are usually only of limited use
in party competition. In addition, some of them touch upon the basic rules of the
political game and therefore should find broad agreement across party lines. Final-
ly, policy preferences are frequently rooted in political convictions. As these prefer-
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tary votes because, most likely, a member of her own PPG dissented. In the state legislature
in Saxony, on various occasions at the end of 2004 (most likely) members of the governing
coalition, made up of CDU and SPD, voted for candidates of the extreme right NPD.
Table 4. Parliamentary reforms considered to be most urgent by MNPs (%)
 11th Bundestag 
1988/89* 
15th Bundestag*** 
2003/04 
(West/East) 
Stronger reporting obligations of government  
to parliament 
30 29 
(28/34) 
Improved public presentation of parliament 
 
37 38 
(38/37) 
More parliamentary staff and better facilities  
in parliament 
35 19 
(19/20) 
Extended chances of political initiatives and 
more speaking time for individual MPs 
39** 6 
(5/7) 
*** Data taken from Herzog et al. [1990: 126].
*** Item phrased slightly differently: strengthening of the position of individual MPs.
*** n = 154 to 156.
ences are more closely connected to current political conflicts they can be expected
to be the biggest source of controversy between PPGs.
In the survey, there are two items that can be considered as measuring ‘basic
convictions’: a forced choice question on freedom versus equality, and the self-rank-
ing of MPs on a ten-point left-right scale. The latter is obviously not a political con-
viction in itself but rather a proxy for it. First of all, there is virtually no difference
in the self-ranking of MPs in the East and the West. This is prima facie a rather puz-
zling finding because the party systems in each part of Germany are different, and
it could be expected that more leftwing positions would be found among East Ger-
man MPs. The explanation for the similarity between East and West comes from the
long-established (parliamentary) parties. Their East German members position
themselves more to the right than their fellow PPG members in the West, on aver-
age by almost half a scale point. This difference can be attributed to the type of par-
ty competition: with the PDS as a dedicated leftist competitor, East German MPs
from the other parties may feel the need to distance themselves from the Socialists
and therefore opt for a more rightist position on the left-right scale.
While the general relationship between PPGs on the left-right MP scale offers
no surprises, an interesting East-West difference does surface. Generally, among
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Table 5. MPs’ self-ranking and the ranking of their party on a ten-point left-right scale 
by PPG (means & standard deviations) 
 Self-ranking of MPs Party ranking by MPs 
 Means STDDEV Means STDDEV 
CDU     
East (n=175) 6.47 1.12 6.20 1.08 
West (n=174/173)  6.09 1.18 6.29 1.06 
FDP     
East (n=15) 5.60 1.12 5.67 0.90 
West (n=34)  5.29 1.27 5.62 0.78 
SPD     
East(n=129/130) 4.12 1.50 4.43 1.18 
West(n=191/194)  3.64 1.22 4.37 1.17 
B90     
East* – – – – 
West (n=39)  3.56 1.07 3.87 1.03 
PDS     
East (n=128/127) 2.58 0,95 2.76 0.97 
West*  – – – – 
Total     
East (n=445) 4.68 2.02 4.77 1.79 
West (n=450/452)  4.69 1.69 5.08 1.47 
* not reported because n < 15.
Eastern MPs almost no difference exists between the actual position of deputies and
the perceived party position, but the West German MPs tend to see themselves
somewhat to the left of their party. This observation is particularly striking in the
case of the Social Democrats, an obvious sign that the programme changes intro-
duced by the party leadership after winning the 1998 Bundestag elections have not
been fully accepted among the party’s state legislators in particular.
The position on the left-right scale strongly correlates with the forced choice
question on freedom and equality (Eta2: .33; p<0.01). More egalitarian views coin-
cide with rather leftist positions. The ‘egalitarians’ among the MPs have a mean of
3.2 on the left-right scale, whereas those that give freedom priority over equality are
far more on the right (mean: 5.0). The differences between East and West are mod-
est, with MPs in and from the new Länder having slightly more egalitarian convic-
tions. Since no East-West divide exists within the two major parliamentary parties
and the Liberal PPGs, the PDS is clearly an outlier here. Only a relative majority of
their MPs express a preference for freedom, with 28–29% respectively either egali-
tarian or undecided. 
East-West differences in political convictions are small compared to inter-par-
ty divisions, but how much does this picture also apply in the case of policy prefer-
ences? The survey contained four questions explicitly referring to politics: on the
importance of compromise and on the role of parties in provoking conflict (the con-
sent-conflict dimensions), and on direct democracy and on political leadership (in-
put-output dimensions). Strong support for two of these questions was observed
among the respondents: first in support for compromise, but also in support for di-
rect democracy. The two other items are sources of controversy. 
Statistically significant differences between East and West German deputies
exist over the issue of the importance of direct democracy and over the statement
that parties unnecessarily provoke political conflicts. MPs in the East support the
former and agree with the latter to a larger extent than their counterparts in the
West. However, in the case of direct democracy this divide stems from the different
PPG composition in both parts of the country. Inter-party differences are strongest
here (Eta2: .24; p<0.01), with the Christian Democrats split over this politics issue
and all other factions (very) strongly in favour. The slightly more positive attitude of
Eastern Christian Democrats, Social Democrats and Liberals towards direct democ-
racy might be interpreted as a legacy of the peaceful revolution in 1989, when citi-
zens’ active involvement in politics spurred the process of democratisation. PPG af-
filiation is also significant for MPs’ attitudes in relation to the statement that a
democracy in the long run is only possible when strong political leadership wards
off conflicting group interests. 
Leaving out the PDS as a specifically Eastern party, overall the regional back-
ground is only meaningful for one of the politics-related questions: the item on par-
ty democracy. Almost fifteen years after unification, East German MPs are still
slightly more sceptical about the role of political parties. However, a closer look at
the differences by PPG reveals that a significant gap exists only in the case of the
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Social Democrats. PPG differences seem to have on the whole a much stronger im-
pact than regional background in the input-output dimension of politics. Given that
(parliamentary) parties are so relevant to policy preferences, we would expect them
to be almost dominant with regard to policy orientations, as these lie at the heart of
what parties regularly dispute over. 
Out of the roughly one dozen questions on policy preferences in the survey,
this analysis limits itself to looking at just two dimensions, which may be consid-
ered the most relevant for testing the stated hypotheses.19 The first dimension refers
to the support for state activity, determined through two items – on job creation and
on the responsibility of citizens for social security – combined into an unweighted
additive index.20 The second index comprises two questions, both of which refer to
a libertarian-authoritarian, or rather freedom versus security dimension.21 In the
case of both indexes the items have a strong positive correlation (with Pearson’s r:
0.27 for the security-freedom index, and 0.51 for the state activity index). 
East German MPs differ from their West German colleagues in relation to
both dimensions by taking slightly more pro-state and pro-freedom stands. At least
for the security versus freedom dimension the positions are reversed once deputies
from the PDS, with their strong pro-civil rights views, are excluded from the analy-
sis. The differences between the old and the new states are overridden by lines of
conflict between parliamentary parties. The PPG division is somewhat pronounced,
and it appears to be stronger on the security-freedom dimension (eta2: 0.52; p<0.01)
than on the state activity index (eta2: 0.39; p<0.01). On state intervention, the
biggest mean difference is between Liberals and Socialists, with Christian Democ-
rats close to the FDP and Social Democrats almost exactly in the middle. The SPD
is the only PPG whose Eastern members are less positive about state activity than
its members in the West. Furthermore, the SPD is distinctive in that intra-party dif-
ferences between Easterners and Westerners exist on both dimensions. On the se-
curity-freedom dimension, PPGs are grouped differently. Here the Christian De-
mocrats with their pro-security orientation are set far apart from the other parlia-
mentary parties. 
So far in this section, party unity – as related to political attitudes – has been
examined by comparing PPGs and by studying their homogeneity. The next step in
the analysis changes the perspective from PPGs as a given parliamentary entity to
individual MPs in search of the right group to join in parliament. The more homo-
geneous a PPG is, and the more PPGs differ from one another, the easier it is to as-
sign an MP to his or her PPG. Therefore, the percentage of MPs correctly assigned
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19 As with any such analysis, the selection of items to some extent determines the results. It
must be noted that by covering two dimensions the most divisive issue between East and
West German MPs is not included: the introduction of nationwide, centralised A-level exams.
20 The items are ‘Creating and preserving jobs is primarily a task of the state’ and ‘The state
should give citizens more responsibility for their social security’. The latter item was recoded.
21 The items are ‘Considering the threat posed by terrorism, the restriction of basic rights is
acceptable’ and ‘Germany should restrict immigration from non-EU countries’.
to their PPG is used here as one indicator of PPG unity. This approach requires use
of discriminant analysis, a statistical tool that makes it possible to examine the si-
multaneous influence of several variables on the distinction between PPGs, and to
maximize the probability of correctly assigning observations to their pre-deter-
mined groups [Klecka 1980]. The analysis is performed using three sets of variables
that separately encompass attitudes on politics22 and the two policy dimensions re-
lating to state activity and to security/freedom.23
The first result, equally valid for East and West, is the difference in the ability
of each of the three sets of variables to generate a correct classification of MPs (see
Table 6). As illustrated by Wilk’s Lambda, the index on politics contributes least to
explaining party differences. In contrast to politics, the two policy dimensions, es-
pecially if combined, serve the purpose much better. Interestingly, the discriminat-
ing power of all three dimensions is generally higher for MPs from the new Länder.
This contrast is most pronounced in the state activity dimension.
Among the PPGs, Christian Democrats in the West are slightly more homoge-
nous than their colleagues from the SPD on two of the three dimensions. Only on
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22 It comprises the following two items: ‘In the long run, democracy is only possible when
strong leadership repels conflicting group interests’ (output) and ‘Referenda (initiated by the
people) are a necessary supplement for representative democracy’ (input).
23 For the wording of the items, see footnotes 20 and 21.
Table 6. MPs correctly assigned to their PPG by discriminant analysis (%)*
 Politics Policies 
 Input/Output Policy I: state 
activity 
Policy II: 
security / 
freedom 
Policy I & II 
combined 
CDU (n=169 to 175) 71 90 84 86 
SPD (n=187 to 194) 67 57 79 81 
West 
Wilk’s Lambda first 
function** (p<0.01) 0.78 0.67 0.49 0.41 
CDU (n=171 to 177) 74 90 85 81 
SPD (n=125 to 129) 27 24 33 48 
PDS (n=115 to 1119) 71 66 75 80 
East 
Wilk’s Lambda first 
function** (p<0.01) 0.68 0.53 0.43 0.36 
 
Note: The results for Liberals and Greens are not reported here because, due to their small
size (low a priori probability), each of them would be assigned to their closest partner even
if they could be relatively well discriminated [Klecka 1980: 46–47].
** The leave-one-out method was used to assign the observations. As a result, the discrimi-
nating functions are generated out of N-1 observations, and the left-out case is classified on
this basis.
** Wilk’s Lambda measures the amount of variance within each group that is left unexplai-
ned by the discriminant function. That means the lower the Lambda the better the classifi-
cation.
the state activity dimension are they substantially more united than the Social De-
mocrats. A somewhat different picture emerges in the East. Whereas the CDU ap-
pears just as homogeneous as in the West and represents by far the most integrat-
ed party, the SPD seems rather more heterogeneous. The majority of Social De-
mocrats are not properly classified in relation to any of the dimensions.24 Most of
the SPD deputies wrongly assigned appear as Christian Democrats, but except for
the state activity dimension the share of those classified as Socialists is only mar-
ginally lower. The evident difficulty in assigning East German Social Democrats cor-
rectly somewhat reflects the precarious position their party occupies in the middle
of the regional party system, which can be illustrated by mapping the relative dis-
tance between parties in a two-dimensional space (see Figure 2).25
This constellation causes centrifugal tendencies within the SPD. As a result,
some of its members lean towards policy preferences characteristic for the CDU,
whereas others tend towards positions frequently held by the PDS. This is simply
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24 It is worth noting that the discriminant analysis refers not only to the homogeneity within
a party but also to the relative distance between parties. That is why the figures presented in
Table 6 should not been regarded as the sole indicator for the homogeneity of a party. 
25 Therefore, the two policy dimensions were combined and rotated in order to obtain two
discriminant functions, which make up the axis of the system. For these it is possible to cal-
culate the average score of every PPG, i.e. ‘the group centroids’, resulting from each score
their MPs get on the functions.
Figure 2. Territorial map of group centroids for PPGs (all MPs) 
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Note: The results for Liberals and Greens in the East are not reported here because of their
small size.
not possible in the West due to the lack of a strong leftwing party. This kind of in-
tra-party division is also reflected in the coalition preferences. The majority of East
German SPD deputies are able to find at least one acceptable coalition alternative.
The Christian Democrats (with a minimal acceptance rate of 79%) are somewhat
favoured as a prospective partner in government over the Socialists (58%) – a dif-
ference that corresponds very well with the results of the discriminant analysis. The
greater homogeneity of CDU and PDS parliamentarians in the East is likewise a re-
flection of their parties’ positions in the regional party system. Unlike the Social De-
mocrats they can be incorrectly assigned only to one other party: the SPD. Indeed,
assigning Christian Democrats to the PDS and vice versa is a rare occurrence and is
no more frequent than the mutual acceptance as coalition partners, which is clear-
ly below 10%. 
The overall picture emerging from the survey data is that West and East Ger-
mans rarely show strong dissent over the various aspects of political orientations.
Significant differences can be found on some policy issues. However, (parliamen-
tary) party membership has a much stronger impact on all three dimensions of po-
litical attitudes discussed in this chapter. While PPGs are relevant, they are any-
thing but united on a number of issues. Within the parties both East-West divisions
and general patterns of heterogeneity emerge. The Social Democrats, especially
their East German parliamentary groups, are the most affected by a lack of inner-
party cohesion on political attitudes.
Conclusion
This article explored the attitudes of East and West German MPs on a variety of is-
sues thirteen years after unification. Of particular interest in this respect are the
deputies elected in East Germany, where the re-emergence of parliamentary life
happened amidst an equally rapid and comprehensive transformation process,
characterised by the massive import of institutions, elites and norms already estab-
lished in Western Germany. Unlike their colleagues in Central and Eastern Europe,
German MPs in the new federal states were faced with pre-established structures,
and they received enormous institutional support. East Germany must therefore be
considered a specific case. 
However, the entry of MPs socialised in a communist regime into new insti-
tutional settings is also interesting from the perspective of EU enlargement, for
which the integration of representative elites constitutes a major challenge. In the
processes of unification and enlargement both, Western institutions are joined by
MPs from a different cultural background, where some other form of institutional
logic existed. Integration requires that MPs both adapt themselves in response to
the institutional challenges and also modify the institutional settings in order to
make them better fit the political and social context in the East. Without this, either
the too rigid institutions would force MPs to become fully assimilated, or the insti-
tutions would lose their capacity to shape the behaviour of the political actors.
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In reference to the hypotheses presented above, the key findings will now be
summarised in order to estimate the overall level of integration between MPs from
the new and the old federal states. The first hypothesis emerged from the assump-
tion of greater East-West integration when institutional incentives are strong, as
could be the case for role perceptions. Less integration seems likely when social
contexts are different and institutional incentives are low, as is the case with politi-
cal attitudes. An interpretation of the results of the 2003–4 survey shows that the
level of integration does not depend that much on whether role perceptions or po-
litical attitudes are compared. While MPs from the new and the old Länder are
somewhat similar in the preferences they expressed regarding the focus of repre-
sentation, the same is also true for basic convictions, most politics items, and even
some policy orientations. Interestingly, even for topics that could be associated with
different socialisation processes or related to the differing socio-economic situations
in East and West Germany (e.g. the demand for state activity) only a moderate
amount of dissimilarity could be discovered. In contrast, striking differences exist
with regard to party discipline, where one could have expected a high degree of sim-
ilarity given that normative expectations are well established. 
East-West divisions, as pointed out at various points in the analysis, may
emerge from two sources: from a gap that cuts across the PPGs, or from the existence
of the PDS as the East German equivalent of a post-communist successor party. The
very fact that the PDS produces some of the variance between East and West is not
meant to imply that these differences should be overlooked. On the contrary, the
PDS is the most visible reminder that, more than a dozen years after German unifi-
cation, East and West have not yet fully converged. In general, differences between
representatives in the new and the old Länder prove important in relation to some
dimensions, and are sometimes more pronounced as intra-party and sometimes as
inter-party differences. However, they are not the main differences even when we
distinguish between different dimensions such as role perceptions and political ori-
entations. Therefore, our first hypothesis is not confirmed. 
Conversely, the second hypothesis seems to fit nicely with the empirical find-
ings: (parliamentary) parties matter far beyond the realm of policy preferences. PPG
affiliation is important for attitudes on politics and for role perceptions. The posi-
tion of one PPG and its distance from other caucuses differs depending on the di-
mension of comparison. Whereas MPs’ political attitudes are largely a matter of par-
ty ideology, role perceptions are influenced more by institutional constraints such
as the electoral system. Despite the at times pronounced differences, there is some
common ground between the parliamentary parties, too. Almost all MPs agree, for
example, on the general preservation of the federal system in Germany and, more
importantly, on the need to seek compromise. The general consent on the latter top-
ic, especially, indicates the prevalence of a unified elite in Germany [Hoffmann-
Lange 2001: 206]. This kind of basic consent among elites has not only been crucial
to the stability of German democracy since the Second World War, it is also con-
sidered to be a conditio sine qua non for successful consolidation in the post-com-
munist countries of Central and East Europe [Higley and Lengyel 2000: 1]. 
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The assumption that the observed distinctiveness of PPGs is to some degree
based upon intra-party homogeneity leads us to the third hypothesis that parlia-
mentary groups represent cohesive actors with strong party discipline and party co-
hesion. However, the findings from the survey reveal instead considerable intra-par-
ty differences if not dissent. They extend to quite a number of policy and politics is-
sues, and they are even reflected in the frequent dissenting votes reported by the re-
spondents. Whether altogether they indicate changes in the relationship between
MPs and parliamentary parties is an open question as long as the effects on the ob-
served voting behaviour (like a lower Rice Index) remain unclear.
However, some of the intra-party differences illustrate one of the most sur-
prising findings from the interviews: the ‘alienation’ of German MPs from their
own party. While this process is silent and somewhat hidden, the evidence for it is
substantial: In addition to the dissentions and the low support for party discipline,
few MPs considered themselves as representatives primarily of their party, few re-
ported that party activities were decisive for their nomination, and almost every sec-
ond deputy was critical about the role of parties in provoking conflicts. Such figures
remind us of the fact that parties “are internal coalitions, comprising factions as well
as fragmented and non-aligned tendencies” [Hazan 2003a: 8]. They must be inter-
preted against the background of recruitment processes that are monopolised by
the parties. Although MPs owe almost every position in their political career to their
party, many present themselves as somewhat detached from it, whether in an effort
to emphasise their autonomy or as a response to perceived anti-party sentiments in
the electorate.
Judging from the test of the three hypotheses, how much integration of East
and West German MPs is there? Whether differences are considered small or big
considerably depends on one’s expectations. Those who focus on the institutional
framework may have expected greater similarity here, whereas researchers who see
MPs’ orientations as rooted in socialisation must be surprised that both groups of
deputies share so many views. Considering these contrasting approaches, no definite
answer to the question is possible here. When differences between PPGs are found
overall to be more pronounced than East-West divisions, this suggests that elite con-
vergence after unification has occurred to some degree. And this remains true even
if the situation is much more complex, with Eastern and Western deputies being
somewhat estranged on some dimensions and issues while rather close on others. 
At the same time, the social experiment of German unification since 1990 of-
fers no blueprints for elite convergence on the European level, as integration oc-
curred under extremely favourable conditions. Judging from our data on MPs’ bi-
ographies and political careers, parliamentary stabilisation and professionalisation
occurred with much greater speed in East Germany than in other post-communist
societies. Nevertheless, the direction of developments seems to be roughly the
same. This preliminary evidence suggests that the convergence of representative
elites in Europe is not only an effect of the transformation path but also a matter of
time.
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Appendix 1. Response rates by parliamentary level and by government-opposition 
affiliation
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Number  
of deputies 
Number  
of interviews 
Response rate  
[RR] (%) 
RR for governing 
PPGs (%) 
RR for 
opposition PPGs 
(%) 
All state parliaments 1.001 765 76.4 71.5 83.1 
East German state 
parliaments 482 384 79.7 74.2 88.6 
West German state 
parliaments 378 265 70.1 62.7 78.5 
Berlin Chamber of Deputies 
(West and East German 
MPs) 
141 116 82.3 84.4 79.7 
European Parliament 
(German MEPs)*   99 33 33.3 – – 
Deutscher Bundestag 603 156 25.9 26.8 24.9 
Total 1703 954 56.0 xxxxx56.0** xxxxx59.1** 
© Project A3 / SFB 580, Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena
* Disregarded for the purpose of this article. 
** Basis: All MPs in the sample parliaments without MEPs.
Appendix 2. Response rates by parliamentary party groups and by East and West German
MPs 
 
Number of 
deputies 
Number of 
interviews 
Response rate 
[RR] (%) 
RR for East 
German MPs 
(%) 
RR for West 
German MPs 
(%) 
CDU (Bundestag: 
CDU/CSU) 683 357 52.2 68.4 42.1 
SPD 566 326 57.6 71.6 50.9 
FDP 104 52 50.0 62.5 46.3 
PDS 142 131 92.2 92.3 91.7 
B90/Die Grünen 96 45 46.9 62.5 45.5 
Others 13 10 76.9 70.0 100.0 
Total* 1604 921 57.4 74.4 46.9 
© Project A3 / SFB 580, Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena
* MEPs excluded.
